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Zero-Based Racial Politics and an Infinity-Based
Response: Will Endless Talking Cure America's
Racial Ills?
RICHARD DELGADO*
In Zero-Based Racial Politics: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case Argu-
ments on Behalf of the Nonwhite Underclass, I I addressed the question, with
which of three political factions ought the nonwhite poor align themselves?
2
I used the term "zero-based" in the title to focus the inquiry on what course
of action would be best for that beleaguered group if we could set aside iner-
tia, habit, traditional alliances, and the like.3 My answer was that the non-
white poor should consider aligning themselves with the principled right of
the Republican Party.
4
In his reply article, Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political Com-
munity,5 Professor Stephen Feldman urges that: (1) racism is much more
wide-ranging and pervasive than most Americans, including constitutional
scholars, realize; 6 (2) appeals to logrolling and self-interest, like those in
Zero-Based Racial Politics, are unlikely to prove able to cope with ills of such
dimension as racism;7 and (3) the right approach is communitarianism,
which, through a process of dialogue and self-examination, will enable us to
reshape our community and self-concept in a fairer, less racist direction.,
I welcome and agree with much of what Feldman says. His insight into
racism's continuing efficacy and the need for its treatment in all areas of
constitutional law, not just equal protection, is valid and urgent.9 Indeed, I
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado; J.D., Boalt Hall School of
Law, University of California, Berkeley, 1974.
1. Richard Delgado, Zero-Based Racial Politics: An Evaluation of Three Best-Case Arguments on
behalf of the Nonwhite Underclass, 78 GEO. L.J. 1929 (1990).
2. The three positions or interest groups I examined were the moderate left (i.e., the Democratic
Party), id. at 1933-37; the moderate right (i.e., the Republican Party), id. at 1940-45; and the dia-
logic left (represented by the emerging strand of communitarian and civic republican writers includ-
ing Joel Handler, Michael Sandel, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Frank Michelman), id. at 1937-40.
3. Id. at 1931-32 (explaining term "zero-based").
4. Id. at 1940-48 (explaining reasons why this group was likely to prove a better ally and source
of aid to black underclass than other groups).
5. Stephen Feldman, Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political Community, 80 GEO. L.J.
1835 (1992).
6. Id. at 1839 ("[r]acism runs... deep and wide"); id. at 1846-47 (virtually everyone in Ameri-
can society harbors racist attitudes; racism ingrained in American culture).
7. Id at 1840-49 (pragmatic racial politics based on appeals to whites' self-interest will fail be-
cause racism prevents most whites from recognizing when their interests coincide with those of
African Americans).
8. Id. at 1850-76 (explaining why a reconstructed dialogism offers promise of abating racism).
9. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance of Ra-
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have made similar arguments elsewhere (although not so eloquently).' 0 Yet,
as I shall argue, his insight does not go far enough. Racism is not merely
common, it is natural and normal-the ordinary state of affairs. I I It informs
all our preconceptions and mental pictures. It is the "normal science" of our
day, part of the baseline, the from-which-we-reason. 1 2 Conversation begins
with racist premises. 13 Indeed, talking will likely just rehearse the dominant
narrative, inscribing its supremacist message even more deeply. Feldman's
insight about racism's ubiquity is, unfortunately, at war with his idealistic
prescription. '
4
Part I of this article sets out three reasons why conversation is unlikely to
provide an effective remedy for society's racial ills, each stemming from mod-
ernist and postmodernist understandings of language, narrativity, and the
social construction of reality. I then examine the role of normative discourse
in combating racism. It is clear from Feldman's article that the conversation
in which he wishes us to engage on matters of race would emphasize this
element heavily-would include much exhortation, shaming, preaching, and
reminding of superordinate common goods and norms.1 5 Normative dis-
course, however, has special pitfalls for the would-be social reformer which I
detail in Part II. A brief conclusion lays out what remains after we under-
cism, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (describing current pervasive racial discrimination
in housing, employment, and education, and citing numerous examples of resurgent hate crimes).
10. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Enormous Anomaly? Left/Right Parallels in Recent Writing
About Race, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1547, 1554-56 (1991) (noting current dissatisfaction of both criti-
cal race theorists and neoconservatives with current liberal civil rights program); Richard Delgado,
Recasting the American Race Problem, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1393-94 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado,
Recasting] (arguing racism is the normal state of affairs, not the exception); see also Richard Del-
gado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L.
REV. 1929, 1929-32 (1991) (arguing diffidence toward outsider groups colors judicial thinking, and
disposes even great jurists to write opinions that society later condemns).
11. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 26-50 (1987) (barriers to racial equality were
adopted by society at beginning of nation's history); Delgado, Recasting, supra note 10, at 1393-94
(arguing "racial subordination is an ordinary, 'normal' feature of our social landscape").
12. On normativity as the "normal science" of our day, and its apologetic function in current
discourse, see Richard Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in
Legal Thought, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 960 (1991) (pointing out that the dominant, normative
mode of discourse renders racial reform difficult). See generally Symposium, The Critique of
Normativity, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991).
13. See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Race, 97 YALE L.J. 1609,
1610-12 (1988) (republicanism assumes a social consensus, and history shows that consensus to be
racist); Richard Delgado, Legal Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REV. 2411, 2412-13 (1989) (legal and political discourse takes place against a backdrop of
presuppositions and shared understandings); Mari Matsuda, Affirmative Action and Plowed-Up
Ground, I 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 2 (1988) (need to incorporate outsiders' vision to combat racist
preconceptions).
14. On the critique of "conversationalism" in legal theory, see generally Robert Justin Lipkin,
Kibitzers, Fuzzies, and Apes Without Tails: Pragmatism and the Art of Conversation in Legal The-
ory, 66 TUL. L. REV. 69 (1991).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 50-57.
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stand conversationalism's limitations, and specifies a slightly revised role for
progressives, like Feldman, who would apply their impressive talents and
energies toward an antiracist program of reform.
I. CONVERSATIONALISM AND ITS LIMITS
Verbal exchanges--conversations-are useful correctives for many types
of error. For example, if you point out to me that I have inadvertently
parked my car in a no-parking zone and am likely to get a ticket, I will very
likely move it. If I mistakenly believe that a heavy object, such as a lead ball,
will fall faster in a vacuum than a light one, say a feather, and you stage a
demonstration showing that this is not so, I will very probably modify my
beliefs accordingly. 16 Verbal exchanges are not likely, however, to be able to
correct broad, systemic ills, such as racism, for a number of reasons.
A. THE FIRST REASON-RACISM IS PART OF THE "DOMINANT
NARRATIVE"
Racism is deeply ingrained in our culture, affecting how we see ourselves
and others, and how we organize social life.17 Messages about race begin to
shape our perception at a very early age.18 They bombard us from many
sources-children's stories, advertising logos, movies, television, the lessons
of parents and peers. 19 These messages tell us that skin color matters, that it
is a determinant of action, personality, and character. Racism is much more
16. The latter fact does not entail a structural change in my attitudes or understanding of the
physical world; it is part of "normal science," i.e., within the current paradigm. See THOMAS S.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 77-79 (2d ed. 1970) (shift in paradigm
occurs only when current paradigm unable to account for anomaly and alternative theory
available).
17. See Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformation and
Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1370-76 (1988) (discussing ways
racism is used to establish a community in opposition to the "other"); Alan David Freeman, Legiti-
mating Racial Discrimination Through Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court
Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, 1052-56 (1978) (describing how antidiscrimination law is embed-
ded in the perspective of the perpetrator, and thus legitimizes oppression); see also supra notes 9-13
and accompanying text.
18. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: Tort Actions for Racial Slurs, Epithets, and
Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 138-43 (1982) (summarizing literature on this
point). See generally MARY ELLEN GOODMAN, RACE AWARENESS IN YOUNG CHILDREN, (1977).
19. See Crenshaw, supra note 17, at 1370-76 (discussing how black stereotypes "serve a hege-
monic function by perpetrating a mythology about both Blacks and whites"); Freeman, supra note
17, at 1052-57 (arguing that antidiscrimination law, viewed traditionally from the perspective of the
perpetrator, fails to address the real needs of the victimized group). For a detailed survey of the
depiction of major ethnic minority groups in film, popular literature, advertising logos, and other
media over 200 years of American history, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the
Outsider in American Law and Culture, 77 CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 1992). See also Ethnic
Notions (PBS television documentary, Feb. 1, 1988) (reviewing history of media depiction of Afri-
can Americans beginning with colonial times).
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than the occasional, isolated, shocking incident we sometimes read about and
condemn-the black who is beaten by a white mob or denied a job or an
apartment, the minority child who is placed in a remedial track in school
despite average or higher intelligence. 20 Rather, it is a way of organizing the
world, part of the "dominant narrative." This understanding of society
changes extremely slowly; we rarely perceive the racism of our age, only that
of previous ages. 21 Any message or suggestion that conflicts with the widely
shared understanding strikes the hearer as coercive, "political," extreme, or
bizarre. 22 This was true of previous eras, and is just as true of our own.23
Since racial assumptions are ingredients in our understanding of "how the
world is," they will inevitably affect which ideas and speakers we credit. Im-
agine, for example, a conversation between a white, liberal faculty appoint-
ments committee member and a colleague of color about affirmative action at
the law school. The professor of majority race has consulted his or her mi-
nority colleague about the problem of finding qualified candidates of color. 24
The appointments committee has been trying hard, the white professor re-
ports, but the pool is so small. 25 Would it be sensible for the school to "take
a chance" and hire candidates A or B, who lack the usual credentials the
committee seeks, but who nevertheless look promising? Would this be fair to
the candidates? To our students?
Imagine the colleague of color carefully examines the candidates' resumes,
then announces that, judging from his experience, both A and B are likely to
prove superlative professors whose publishing and teaching will far exceed
that of the majority-race candidates the committee is currently considering.
20. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 17, at 1054 (pointing out that law's condemnation of the occa-
sional vicious-willed cross burner or other perpetrator of flagrant racist acts enables us to believe
that our society otherwise functions in nonracist, egalitarian fashion); Charles R. Lawrence III, The
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317,
317-18, 336-44 (1987) (citing evidence and examples of unconscious racism).
21. See Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 19 (referring to belief that we can see the racism of our
time as "empathic fallacy"); Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 10 at 1953-57 (presenting evidence of
social bias in literature and the incremental rate at which change occurs).
22. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing
Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1992); see also JEFF ADAMS, THE CONSPIRACY OF THE
TEXT: THE PLACE OF NARRATIVE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THOUGHT (1986); ANTONIO
GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOK 323-43 (Q. Hoare & G.N. Smith trans./
eds., 1971) (intellectual revolution cannot be achieved solely by confronting one philosophy with
another; "common sense," the uncritical and unconscious way of understanding the world must
also be confronted); Terrence Des Pres, On Governing Narrative: The Turkish-Armenian Case, 75
YALE L. J. 517 (1986).
23. See generally Delgado & Stefancic, supra note 19; Ethnic Notions, supra note 19.
24. I analyze several aspects of this problem through the use of "counter-storytelling" in Opposi-
tionists, supra note 13, at 2418-35.
25. On this "pool is so small" argument and responses thereto, see Richard Delgado, Mindset
and Metaphor, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1872, 1875-76 (1990) (pool metaphor apologetic and inapt be-
cause it conjures images of inert, stagnant body filled with fungible material).
1882 [Vol. 80:1879
ENDLESS TALKING
Further, the professor offers reasons why this is so. 2 6 Everyone knows the
likely reaction: the calmly given evidence and arguments on behalf of A and
B will scarcely be heard. They will not "register," will not "compute," will
certainly not be passed on to the rest of the appointments committee for
sober consideration. They are outside the pale, outside the dominant para-
digm, which holds that minority candidates are risks, are likely to be margi-
nal publishers and teachers, that those with promise are few in number and
difficult to entice, and so forth. The white professor expected to hear about
risks; instead he heard about superiority. He expected to discuss the limits of
magnanimity, but heard something totally different. He did not expect to
hear about the likelihood of A or B's professional success, and so the message
falls on deaf ears. "Yes, yes, but should we take a chance?"
27
B. THE SECOND REASON-RACISM IS NOT A MISTAKE
Assumptions about race are thus very hard to dislodge. They are among
the tools with which we reason, parts of the arsenal we use to organize and
understand reality. And our understanding changes very slowly. We rarely
focus on it; it is like a set of eyeglasses through which we see and interpret
the world around us. 28 But there is a second reason why attitudes and beliefs
regarding race do not readily change as a result of conversation and dialogue:
racist ideas and actions are rarely mistakes.
If you point out to me that I have inadvertently parked in the wrong zone
or formed a mistaken belief that heavy objects fall faster than light ones, I
will probably quickly concede my error and modify my behavior or beliefs
accordingly. With these types of error the marketplace premise of our sys-
tem of free speech is essentially correct-the right message will rise up and
counter the wrong one; truth will conquer error.
29
26. These reasons might include: superior drive and determination, more highly developed nar-
rative and analytical skills, and a grounding in postmodern and critical thought. See Delgado,
supra note 22 (reporting that nearly three-fourths of articles on civil rights or feminism appearing in
major law reviews between 1985 and 1990 were written by women or minorities); Richard Delgado,
Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 YALE L.J. 1357 (1992) (hypothesizing that members of outsider groups
may have advantage in grasping and applying modernist and critical thought).
27. A second anecdote illustrates this point. Recently a young African-American lawyer I know
was on the legal hiring market. Although young, she had a sterling record in law school and had
published her first article in the Harvard Law Review. Friends and supporters at a number of the
schools where she interviewed found colleagues expressing doubts about her scholarly potential;
"How do we know she will publish?" When her supporters pointed out that she had already done
so, and in the Harvard Law Review, they were met with blank stares, even though the article was
prominently listed on her resum6 and had been mentioned during many of her interviews.
28. On the eyeglass analogy and the role of preconception in determining what we can see and
imagine, see Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform,
Critical Librarianship, and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207, 209 (1989).
29. See United States v. Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (advocating
marketplace of ideas theory). For a discussion of the marketplace theory and other functions of
18831992]
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Racism and racial-supremacist ideas are not simple mistakes, however;
they are not easily correctable errors of fact that can be dispelled by present-
ing the truth. To illustrate, imagine a second encounter which takes place at
a university campus that has suffered a wave of racist insults and name-call-
ing.30 The university president has opted against promulgating a campus
speech code that would penalize racially demeaning speech uttered in face-
to-face situations 31 on the ground that campuses ought to be bastions of free
speech. 32 Racism, sexism, and homophobia, the president believes, are prod-
ucts of "ignorance and fear."' 33 Since this is so, the president reasons, the
appropriate corrective is more speech. We should not attempt to quell or
punish expressions of racist ideas, but rather should use them as helpful flags
signalling the need for remonstrance, counselling-in short, the truth.
Try to imagine, however, what kind of countervailing message the black
victim of a racist insult would deliver to the racist who has just said, perhaps:
"You n-. You and your kind do not belong here-why don't you go back
to Africa?" If prejudice were indeed a matter of ignorance, then we might
visualize the black replying in one of the following ways: (1) "Sir (or
madam), did you realize that the better view, in our day and age, is that I, an
African American, am your equal and have just as much right to be here as
you do?" or (2) "Sir (or madam), did you realize that calling me, a person of
African-American heritage and descent, a 'n-' might cause me to take of-
fense? Now that you understand this, in the future, will you please call me
- or _?,,34
These responses are, of course, ludicrous. Racism is not a mistake, like
parking in the wrong space or believing that the solar system has eight plan-
ets; rather, it is a means of subjugating another person or group. The racist
insult tells the victim, "Here is how I see you. You occupy this rung in the
hierarchy; I occupy this other one." Racism is a hierarchy-maintaining insti-
tution. It is enjoyable, as well as profitable, for the group able to get away
speech, see Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 878-86 (1963).
30. The following discussion in the text is based on remarks of various participants at: Panel
Discussion, Campus Speech, Yale Law School, New Haven, Ct., (Oct. 1991) [hereinafter Panel
Discussion].
31. Most campus codes limit their proscription of hate speech to such situations. See generally
Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L.
REV. 343 (1991) (discussing student conduct rules drafted to cope with campus racism and name-
calling); Mari Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH.
L. REV. 2320 (1989) (same).
32. Panel Discussion, supra note 30 (remarks by Benno C. Schmidt, Professor of Law and Presi-
dent of Yale University); Delgado, supra note 31, at 359-60 (discussing "bastion of freedom"
argument).
33. Panel Discussion, supra note 30 (remarks by Benno C. Schmidt, Professor of Law and Presi-
dent of Yale University).
34. Id. (remarks by Richard Delgado).
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with it.35 If the subordinated group internalizes some of the messages of
inferiority, so that it comes to consent to its own oppression, so much the
better. 36 Counter-racist messages, then, are not only unheard (because they
fall outside the dominant paradigm), but ineffectual because their premise is
misconceived. The point of a racist practice is to secure and defend advan-
tage, not to pursue truth.
37
C. THE THIRD REASON-REMEDYING RACISM THROUGH DIALOGUE IS
IMPRACTICAL
A small percentage of racism is, in fact, recognized at the time of its com-
mission, 38 and a small number of advantage-seeking subordinators can be
persuaded to discontinue their actions by the right counter-racist message.
39
But why would one want to operate in this fashion, at least without exploring
and comparing other possibly more effective avenues? Many social scientists
today subscribe to some version of the "confrontation" theory for reducing
racism, one that does not rest primarily on moral suasion or dialogue.
4°
Consider some of the barriers to establishing an effective counter-racist dia-
logue with a racist individual or institution:
4'
1. The initiator of the counter-racist dialogue will probably be a person of
minority race, or a majority-race stand-in, and hence will lack credibil-
ity in the eyes of the other parties to the dialogue.
42
2. The stronger party will be asked to admit error-something every law-
yer knows to be a barrier to negotiation or settlement. 43
35. Id.
36. On hegemony and "false consciousness" (whereby the oppressed internalize and accept their
own oppression), see generally GRAMSCI, supra note 22, at 323-43.
37. On the economic-determinist view of racism, see generally BELL, supra note 11, at 51-74;
Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L.
REV. 518 (1980). See also Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758 (discussing Black
nationalism and separatism as response to culture's indifference to Black causes).
38. I refer to the type of blatantly racist act--cross-burning, lynching, lying about an apartment's
availability-that we all seize on and condemn, that we "love to hate." ("This is racism-see, we
condemn it"; outside it, nothing else happens.)
39. See infra note 60 and accompanying text (giving examples of messages that occasionally
work).
40. For a discussion of the confrontation approach (which relies on punishment, watchfulness,
and vigilant enforcement) and its relation to the "contact" hypothesis (which emphasizes teaching,
example, and cooperative activity to reduce racist attitudes and behavior), see Richard Delgado et
al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1375-91 (discussing social science theories on racism's etiology as well as
control).
41. I mentioned a few of these barriers in Delgado, supra note 1, at 1939-40.
42. See Delgado, supra note 31, at 385 (arguing that racism reduces the credibility of its victims,
making free speech much more useful to the majority than minority).
43. See GARY BELLOW & BEA MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCEss 543 (1978) (on dynamics
of negotiation and lawyer interaction).
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3. The two sides to the dialogue will be asked to trust each other, a trust
that will seem to one (the black) to be belied by 200 years of history."
4. The two sides will begin with different definitions, preconceptions, and
world-views, necessitating a lengthy "dialog-about-dialog" before the
real dialogue can begin.
45
5. One side (again, the black) will enter in a spirit of pessimism, 4 6 know-
ing from experience that "talk is cheap," and will suspect that this
dialogue, like all the others, will be coercive-that she will be the one
expected to make concessions. This party will recall that the dominant
group, prior to every racist or imperialist action, has justified its course
by talk, frequently of a normative or religious sort.
47
II. A SPECIAL REASON FOR SKEPTICISM-THE NORMATIVE QUALITY OF
THE DIALOGUE FELDMAN ENVISIONS
Since much racism is perpetrated either blithely48 or for advantage, 49 most
of the dialogue the communitarians have in mind will probably be highly
normative. "You don't see what you did as offensive? Well, you should!"
Or, "I realize you do this to feel good, gain advantage, eliminate the competi-
tion, keep your other tenants happy, and so on, but you should nevertheless
stop." Feldman's own descriptions of dialogism make this plain. For exam-
ple, dialogue will be aimed at identifying "the common good." 50 It will en-
able us to "transform" (presumably for the better) our viewpoints.51 It will
promote a "feminist ethic of caring."' 52 It will "encourage concern for and
connection with others. ' 53 It will develop a "public norm with potentially
positive effects." '54 It will use "love" and "agape" as tools of conversion. 55 It
will enable a "transformative dialogue... [resulting in] communal growth or
improvement. ' 56 It will "appeal to the moral conscience of the entire polit-
44. See generally BELL, supra note 11 (reviewing United States history of black-white relations,
concluding on pessimistic note); DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed.
1980) (same); Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (arguing that
blacks and other persons of color should understand that existing American political and legal
systems are unlikely to afford much relief).
45. Delgado, supra note 1, at 1939-40.
46. See Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 44 (participants to dialogue radically unequal in power
and resources); Delgado, supra note 1, at 1939 (same).
47. For a discussion of the role of normative discourse to legitimate ruthless action against
weaker populations, see Delgado, supra note 12, at 937-59. See also infra Part II.
48. See supra Part L.A (racism part of dominant narrative, hence nearly invisible).
49. See supra Part L.a (racism promotes advantage).
50. Feldman, supra note 5, at 1836.
51. Id. at 1841.
52. Id. at 1861.
53. Id. at 1861-62, 1864-65, 1871.
54. Id. at 1865.
55. Id. at 1869-70.
56. Id. at 1871.
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ical community by pursuing the common good." 5 7
As I have mentioned earlier, there is nothing wrong with employing
counter-racist messages and dialogue; some may actually do some small
good. 58 The trouble is that highly normative talk-full of importuning,
pleading, imploring, and pronouncements of this or that course of action as
wrong and evil-is likely to fail, and very possibly make matters worse.
There already exists a well-known norm against discrimination and preju-
dice.5 9 What good would further remonstrance do? As the emerging cri-
tique of normativity demonstrates, for every normative argument there is an
equally plausible normative counterargument.60 Affirmative action is neces-
sary to redress discrimination; affirmative action is unfair to innocent whites.
Diversity is good; we must maintain standards. Our normative system is so
open-ended that by choosing a premise carefully, one side can make it appear
that the other is trying to do something unscrupulous, is trying to play the
game by unfair rules, is political, self-interested, unprincipled, wrong. Nor-
mative discourse, in short, is indeterminate and manipulable. 61 But using
normative appeals, eliciting the predictable countering responses, round and
round in familiar, well-worn circles, inscribes the ineffectual discourse pat-
terns (in which minorities lose) even more deeply.62 Not only does a moral
appeal rarely get anywhere, it often obscures the very dilemma.
The main threat to human dignity and autonomy today is not individual
agents with vicious wills. It is large bureaucracies-corporations, HMOs,
57. Id. at 1872, 1877.
58. For example, "If you do that again, we will ostracize you, boycott your business, charge you
with a Title VII violation."
59. See generally GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE (spec. ed. 1979) (point-
ing out that the problem is how to get people to act on this norm). In law, the antidiscrimination
norm is incorporated into three constitutional amendments (the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth), and a host of legislation prohibiting discrimination in education, housing, employment, and
various business practices, both at the state and federal level. See, e.g., THEODORE EISENBERG,
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION 3-7 (3d ed. 1991) (discussing statutes enacted to protect civil rights);
NORMAN VIEIRA, CONSTITUTIONAL CIVIL RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 61-140, 210-49 (2d ed. 1990)
(same).
60. See Delgado, supra note 12, at 938-44 (indeterminacy of normative discourse facilitates self-
deception, rationalization, and "striking a deal with the future"); Pierre Schlag, Normative and
Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 167 (1990) ("the exhilarating experience that comes from
reading a provocative new piece of Legal Thought ... will give way to ennui as the new piece of
Legal Thought unravels.").
61. For a related critique by critical legal scholars of determinacy in legal reasoning, see gener-
ally THE POLITICS OF LAW (David Kairys ed., 2d ed. 1990). On the feminist critique of the legal
system as embodying a (frequently unseen) male, patriarchal bias, see generally CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987).
62. The best exposition of this view is Schlag, supra note 60. See also Pierre Schlag, Normativity
and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 932 (1991) (normative legal thought rehearses
and inscribes a false social aesthetic).
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industries, and political parties.63 These organizations function best if they
can treat the rest of us impersonally, as numbers, members of large, faceless
groups. They dislike change, dislike challenge. All these are inefficient. Yet,
impersonal treatment (all blacks must work as custodians; all taxpayers must
fill out this twenty-one-page form) could breed resentment, which could dis-
rupt the routine. 64 Therefore, bureaucracies adopt a host of smiling agents to
talk with us, reassure us that we are, indeed, being treated as individuals,
being treated with respect, when in fact we are not. These agents-lawyers,
personnel managers, insurance adjusters, claims agents, and other "front"
persons-talk a particular language-normativity. "We want, of course, to
do what is fair, but you must admit your share of the responsibility in this
accident. We must be fair to our other policyholders." Or, "Mr. Jones, we
are sorry we cannot hire you for the position. While you might turn out to
be an outstanding teacher and scholar, Civil Rights is not high on our list of
priorities for course coverage this year; and, further, your class standing
...." Or, "The HMO cannot grant your claim-we must think of our other
patients."
65
In each of these well-rehearsed and earnest-seeming discussions the script
turns out to be written by someone else-what I call the "Home Office." If
we press a little, we will discover that the insurance adjuster does not really
care for us as persons. The point of the numbing, familiar dialogue is to lull,
to gull, us into thinking the organization really does care-values our health,
our contribution to a multiethnic faculty, values us as consumers. If we go
along with the script we will cause little trouble, may indeed end up thinking
we behaved virtuously. But we have been set up. We have been, like the doe
in the headlights, transfixed by the approaching automobile. To be sure,
sometimes the kind driver will swerve; sometimes the insurance adjuster will
grant a claim-it turns out he or she had a little discretion after all. The
doctor will see us now, not next month. The law school will hire a token
black. But the doe's problem is not the approaching car-it is the road. An-
other car will come along. In the same way, allowing ourselves to be mes-
merized by familiar, soothing normative talk disables us from appreciating
our own dilemma, from seeing who is responsible for it, from seeing the way
out of it.
If we enter into the platitudinous, scripted discourse that normative talk
demands, we will cause little trouble. But from time to time we will get a
little jolt-be brought up short, made to realize it was the Home Office that
was calling the shots after all. The superbly qualified minority was not
63. For the initial development of the textual argument, see Delgado, supra note 12, at 956-58
(normative discourse affirmatively justifies cruelty toward others and sets up the listener).
64. Id. at 957.
65. Id. at 958-59.
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hired-what happened? I made those wonderful normative arguments.
They said ... I thought ....
CONCLUSION
I have argued that Feldman, like most conversationalists, overestimates
the ability of dialogue to counter racism. We simply do not see most of to-
day's forms of racism. Speaking against it is a near-impossibility, and the few
counter-racist speakers, authors, painters, and other communicators have no
audience. We also underestimate racism's momentum. Powerful actors and
institutions benefit from it-why should they stop merely because we want to
talk things over with them? Finally, the highly normative nature of the con-
versation Feldman contemplates presents problems of its own-problems of
efficacy, problems of lulling, problems of inscribing the routine a little
deeper-even as we think we are striking a blow for truth and justice.
Feldman's mistake is natural. A nonracist himself, he thinks, "If I could
only talk with David Duke, or the chair of the appointments committee, or
the member of Bush's cabinet who..., I am sure I could change her mind. I
could get her to see . . . ." A fault of conversationalism is that we assign it
the efficacy it would have if we (the right-thinking conversationalists) were to
prevail in every case. But the dominant narrative changes very slowly. Ask
yourself, when is the last time you succeeded, through argument alone, in
changing another person's position on a matter of fundamental normative
importance, such as abortion?
Toward the end of his article, Feldman seems to concede that conversa-
tionalism might have limits, and that interest-convergence and logrolling of
the sort I put forward in Zero-Based Racial Politics might be a more effective
means of securing advances for outsider groups. 66 We should work both ap-
proaches, Feldman says, employing interest-convergence where it seems fit-
ting, while using dialogue and suasion to change attitudes and moral climate.
I find no fault with this formulation; as a racial realist, I believe there is little
we can do to improve our position, 67 so we might as well try anything. How-
ever, I would make one small modification in the twin strategy Feldman pro-
poses. People of color should occupy themselves with interest-convergence.
We should lobby, agitate, destabilize, rock the boat, and constantly point out
to the powers that be why it is in their interest to permit occasional, small
gains for blacks and other minorities. As Derrick Bell put it recently (out of
66. Feldman, supra note 5, at 1877 ("The nonwhite poor, consequently, might consider a dual
strategy.").
67. I have elaborated my pessimistic view of our racial prospects in Richard Delgado, Derrick
Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923 (1988) (review-
ing DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987)).
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the mouth of an old black woman), "I lives to harass white folks."' 68
It is people of the majority race, persons of good will, well-wishers and
fellow-travellers like Feldman, who should take on the task of conversation.
They should be the ones to take the case to their recalcitrant brothers and
sisters, to remonstrate, cajole, importune, and preach the normative messages
of brotherhood, equality, and decency that are inscribed in our founding doc-
uments. For the reasons I have mentioned, this is likely to do little good.
But if done carefully, with awareness of its limitations and risks, it will prob-
ably do little harm either, and in the meantime it at least keeps issues of
racial justice on the front burner.
68. Bell, Racial Realism, supra note 44.
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